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monides has a consistent theory of parable that allows us to unlock some of the secrets of 
the Guide, one cannot think of a better presentation of the skeptical thesis than the pres-
ent book. Even the skeptics will profit from the philosophically rich analyses in this book.
C h a r l e s  H .  M a n e k i n 
University of Maryland
José Filipe Silva. Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul: Plurality of Forms and Censorship in the 
Thirteenth Century. Investigating Medieval Philosophy, 3. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012. 
Pp. xii + 313. Cloth, $203.00.
Until very recently, Robert Kilwardby was known mostly as the Dominican archbishop who in 
1277 condemned Aquinas’s position on the unicity of substantial form in Oxford. Although 
his (early) logical writings have received ample attention in the past few decades, this, 
arguably, had little impact on the overall perception of Kilwardby. Silva’s monograph aims 
to revise this picture by giving a detailed account of Kilwardby’s views on the human soul 
and cognition, aspects of his thought that have so far received little attention. It should be 
mentioned that this important project of fleshing out Kilwardby’s own philosophical views 
has been continued by the recently published Companion to the Philosophy of Robert Kilwardby 
(Brill, 2013), edited by Henrik Lagerlund and Paul Thom, to which Silva also contributed. 
The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with Kilwardby’s views on the on-
tological structure of human beings; the second deals with his theory of knowledge; and 
the third and smallest part relates the findings from part 1 to the Oxford prohibitions. In 
the first part, Silva gives a detailed and nuanced account of Kilwardby’s views, showing the 
different layers of ontological complexity Kilwardby introduces in human beings, both 
on the level of the soul and on the level of the body. The analysis more than adequately 
supports one of Silva’s main theses, namely that “Kilwardby was not an anti-Aristotelian, 
but an Augustinian who was also an Aristotelian” (18), although he sides with Augustine 
whenever there are irreconcilable differences. 
Part 2 addresses the processes involved in cognition, and is divided into two subparts: 
on sense perception and on intellectual cognition. The part on sense cognition presents 
further evidence of Kilwardby’s attempt at providing an account of the human soul and 
its functions that is compatible with both Aristotle and Augustine, and Silva’s account is 
again thorough and convincing. The part on intellectual cognition, by contrast, deals with 
such a great variety of topics that it tends to lose some focus at times, and the end result is 
more of a broad overview than an in-depth study of the topic. Among the many topics ad-
dressed are angelic cognition, language, theories of illumination, Kilwardby’s conception 
of scientific knowledge and truth, and the Trinitarian model for the soul. 
Throughout the book, Silva mentions his desire to understand Kilwardby’s motivations 
for issuing his prohibitions as the primary motivation to study his views on the soul and 
cognition. Perhaps this is why the prohibitions feature so prominently in the book’s title. 
Nevertheless, the third part is best viewed as an appendix to the detailed discussion of 
Kilwardby’s views of the structure of human beings undertaken in part 1. Partly because of 
the high quality of the analysis in the first two parts, it is also somewhat disappointing. On 
the positive side, Silva succeeds at (re)establishing that it is highly unlikely that Kilwardby’s 
prohibitions were directed mainly or even primarily at Thomas Aquinas. Rather, it seems 
he wanted to reject any theory that failed to provide the required ontological complexity 
within the human soul, without necessarily having one particular variant in mind. On the 
negative side, a full analysis of all sixteen prohibited propositions in naturalibus is curiously 
absent; in fact, not even all are listed. One would at least expect a more detailed discussion 
of proposition 16 in this context: “that the intellective soul is united to prime matter in 
such a way that it corrupts all that preceded all the way down to prime matter,” since the 
link with Aquinas’s views is (and has been) so easily made. Moreover, Silva seems to fol-
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low a still-common misrepresentation of the council of Vienne (1311–12) when he writes 
that it “would elect the Thomist unicity thesis as the official doctrine of the Church” (5). 
It did not. Rather it merely condemned the position that the intellective soul is not truly 
and per se the form of the body, without directly commenting on the unicity or plurality 
of forms debate. This is why the Franciscan Gerard of Odo, for instance, was able to frame 
the Council’s decree as one in favor of a plurality of forms.
This criticism aside, two general features of Silva’s monograph are especially noteworthy. 
The first is the impressively wide range of Kilwardby’s writings that it is based on. The second 
is its sensitivity to the relations between the debates on the structure of the human soul 
and other contexts, not only that of theology (for example, the incarnation of Christ, the 
transmission of original sin, angelic cognition), but also that of natural philosophy more 
generally. The main parts of the book are well argued and clearly written. In sum, it deserves 
to be read by everyone interested in the medieval history of philosophical psychology. 
S a n d e r  W .  d e  B o e r
University of Groningen
Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, editors. Aquinas and the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. x + 275. Cloth, $95.00.
The main question addressed in this volume is to what extent did Thomas Aquinas “deal 
with and depend on Aristotle’s Ethics” (1). The editors and contributors discuss the set-
ting and intent of Thomas’s commentary (Sententiae supra libros Ethicorum) on the text of 
Aristotle, which was likely completed during his magisterial activity at Paris in 1271–72. 
They consider various scholarly opinions on the commentary, including those concerning 
its date of composition and whether Thomas expresses his own views, or merely provides a 
careful exposition of Aristotle’s text. An important topic for all contributors is the consid-
eration of the commentary in light of Thomas’s theological treatises, especially the Summa 
theologiae, in order to understand how Thomas’s reading of Aristotle’s moral philosophy 
contributes to his own understanding of important issues in ethics. 
The first two articles by Terrence Irwin and Michael Pakaluk discuss the accuracy and 
general approach of Thomas toward Aristotle. Both rightly indicate that Thomas does not 
approach Aristotle in the manner of a modern scholar who seeks faithfully to explain the 
text, but rather as a way to discover truth. Although Thomas always attempts to comprehend 
Aristotle’s thought thoroughly, he does not hesitate to indicate its limits when compared 
to religious belief. Thomas is generally reluctant to criticize Aristotle directly and often 
provides a charitable reading for controversial ideas. When discussing the question of the 
possibility of perfect beatitude, Thomas claims that Aristotle refrained from such a discus-
sion in Ethics, because the fate of the separate soul belongs to a different science. Irwin 
concludes that we ought to take Thomas seriously as a historically accurate interpreter of 
Aristotle, even if he does introduce un-Aristotelian topics, such as the will, into his under-
standing of Aristotle (30). 
Jörn Müller’s article builds upon his earlier work on Albert the Great on the relation be-
tween happiness and beatitude. Müller claims that Aristotle offers “not one unified account 
of happiness, but rather a ‘two-fold happiness’” (55). Albert did indeed accept the notion 
of two distinct types of happiness (due felicitates), but Thomas rejects this interpretation in 
favor of one that views Aristotelian eudaimonia as the single perfection of human beings 
within a lifetime. Müller indicates the importance of the qualification by Aristotle that hu-
man beings can only be beati ut homines for Thomas’s view that perfect beatitude may be 
attained in the afterlife (62). Here Müller believes that Thomas seems brazenly to ignore 
Aristotle’s designation of the contemplative life as perfect happiness. Thomas, however, 
did not have so much difficulty in showing that the philosophical life does not meet the 
criterion for ultimate finality and self-sufficiency, since he finds support in Aristotle’s own 
